人種主義の政治 アン・ゴマー・スナハラ 著

第1章1941年11月

In November 1941 Thomas Kunito Shoyama was an editor of the 『ニュー・カナディアン』, a fledgling Japanese Canadian newspaper in Vancouver, British Columbia. As such, Shoyama was a principal spokesman for the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League, an organization founded in 1936 to fight discrimination against Japanese Canadians. Well educated, articulate and capable, Shoyama was not an editor by choice. On graduating from the University of British Columbia in 1938 with an honours degree in commerce and economics, he had intended to enter the world of business. He quickly discovered, however, that ability and high academic achievement meant nothing when you were Japanese. Fifty years of legislation and regulation had closed most of the professions, the public service and teaching to him, while social taboos discouraged Caucasian businessmen from hiring him in any but the most menial capacity. In British Columbia, where 95 per cent of Canada's 23,450 Japanese resided in 1941, Shoyama could not even vote, although he was Canadian-born. Shoyama's outstanding abilities would in time make him one of Canada's most powerful civil servants, but in British Columbia in 1941 he was simply a "Jap."¹

While Shoyama's employment problems were typical of those facing all Japanese Canadians, he represented only one of the three socio-cultural groups making up Japanese Canadian society in 1941: the 一世, the Kibei and the 二世. Shoyama was a spokesman only for the last group. Almost 10,000 Japanese Canadians were 一世, or immigrants from Japan and Hawaii, some 3,650 of whom had become naturalized Canadians before 1923 when Canadian nationality was made very difficult for Japanese to obtain.² Most 一世 were from the land-owning peasant class of Japan. They had grown up in the rapidly modernizing Meiji period (the years 1868 - 1912 when Japan was emerging as an industrialized world power) and had come to Canada before the First World War. By 1941 they had spent an average of thirty years working in fishing, farming and agriculture, or in building up small businesses. Denied access to the larger Canadian society, culturally the 一世 remained a microcosm of Meiji Japan.

第二次世界大戦後、 Kibei were Canadian-born but Japan-educated Japanese Canadians. As such they varied across the cultural spectrum. Those who had been sent to Japan at a young age and had stayed for their whole education were culturally Japanese. They were not exactly like their parents, for the Japan of the 1920s and 1930s that the Kibei knew was different from the Japan their parents had known. Those who had been sent to Japan for only part of their education knew intimately two very different cultures. Most preferred the less rigid culture of Canada. Some, however, were discouraged by the racism they had met in Canada and preferred Japan. Fluent in Japanese, the Kibei understood and had a greater empathy for Japanese culture than the 二世.^A

第二次世界大戦後、 二世 were Canadian-born and Canadian-educated like Shoyama. They had been exposed to the full force of the acculturating influences of the Canadian public school system. They had been carefully taught that things British and Canadian were right and that, by inference, all else was suspect. Racism, they were told, was the fault of the nonwhite minorities. The cause of racism, they were taught, was the failure of nonwhites to assimilate into the Anglo-Canadian culture. Only when they became totally Canadian could they take their rightful place in Canadian society. The 二世 learned their lessons well. By 1941 their main criticism of the 一世 and the Kibei was that they were too Japanese.

While taught to accept Anglo-canadian standards, the 二世 could never be full-fledged members of the larger society. Nor, handicapped by poor Japanese, could they be full participants in the Japanese subculture of the 一世 and the Kibei. Without being aware of it, the 二世 lived at the fringes of both the 一世 subculture and the larger white community, vainly trying to interpret each to the other. Their cultural marginality was complicated by their age. In 1941 only 5,000 of the 13,600 Canadian-born Japanese were over twenty years of age. Shoyama, one of their principal spokesmen, was only twenty-three. To the 一世, the 二世 were only a bunch of kids. By the standards of both Canadian society and the Japanese subculture, the 二世 were still far too young to be consulted on matters of importance, let alone to serve as leaders. With their Canadian education and outlook and the arrogance of youth, however, the 二世 assumed that they understood the times and their society better than their parents.³

1941年11月までに、世界情勢は日系人にとって深刻なものになっていた。1932年以来、日本の中国大陸侵略は増大しており、日本は1940年9月にドイツとイタリアと同盟を結んだ。そして1941年秋には、第二次世界大戦でまだ中立国の立場を維持していた米国との交渉は、悪化の一途をたどっていた。米国は日本が中国大陸から撤退することを要求し、日本は米国が自分の要求を通すために行った石油禁輸の影響を受け始めていた。日系人は、もし日本が米国と中国大陸をめぐって戦争になり、カナダがこの戦争に巻き込まれれば、自分たちへの影響は甚大になると恐れた。

In late November 1941 Thomas Shoyama, English-language editor of the 『ニュー・カナディアン』, was both optimistic and pessimistic about those consequences. Recalling the experiences of German and Italian aliens in 1939 and 1940, Shoyama presumed that all Japanese aliens would be required to report regularly to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, that Japanese community associations and the Japanese-language press would be investigated, and that a few Japanese aliens would be interned. Pessimistically he presumed that the parallel to the Germans and Italians would end there. He doubted that the immunity granted Canadian nationals of German and Italian ancestry would be extended to the 二世. Rather he expected that the 二世 and naturalized would be treated like aliens and required to report regularly to the RCMP. Shoyama also anticipated that Japanese Canadian fishermen, all of whom were Canadian nationals, would be treated harshly.⁴

ショーヤマは、これらの政府の処置よりももっと深刻な問題は、カナダ人の日系人に対する破壊行為と暴力だろう、と心配した。1940年春に起こったバンクーバーのドイツ・バプティスト教会に対する破壊行為は、カナダ人大衆が、戦時にどんな無責任な行動に出るかを示していると思った。BC州でずっと続いている日系人に対する人種差別意識は、きっと日系人に対する破壊行動と暴力を招くと思った。しかしショーヤマは一方で、このような不逞行為はBC州の良識を持つ人々と、新聞に非難されると楽観した。特に新聞は、良識と法と秩序の砦になる、と確信していた。連邦政府も、理性と良識を持って問題に対処する、と確信していた。日本軍の真珠湾攻撃の2週間前に、ショーヤマは『ニュー・カナディアン』紙の読者に、「扇動された大衆の不逞行為の方が、政府による日系人政策より、もっと日系人に深刻な被害を及ぼす。」と書いていた。⁵

Shoyama had good reasons for all of his conclusions, especially the pessimistic ones. By November 1941 he was very familiar with the personalities and the arguments of those most opposed to Japanese Canadians. As a spokesman for the 二世, he had read the half-truths, exaggerations and outright lies of the White Canada Association, the latest in a long line of nativist groups dedicated to combating the "evils" of the Asian presence in British Columbia. He had witnessed the federal election of 1935, when both Liberals and Conservatives sought votes by smearing the CCF^B party as pro-Asian. He had listened to the ranting of Alderman Halford Wilson as he enlivened the meetings of Vancouver's city council with his many anti-Asian proposals. Most infamous was his proposal that Asians be segregated into ghettos, as the Jews were in Nazi Germany.⁶

Shoyama knew that Liberal and Conservative politicians, both provincial and federal, would jump on any anti-japanese bandwagon. While their degree of enthusiasm would vary according to the personal standards of each man, no Liberal or Conservative politician questioned the tradition of exploiting the anti-Asian feelings of the B.C. electorate. Indeed some were zealots. Men like Thomas Reid, the Liberal M.P. for New Westminster, and A.W. Neill, an Independent representing Comox-Alberni, had consistently assumed an anti-asian position, using arguments and literature supplied by the White Canada Association. Their styles were very different. Reid presented his irrational arguments with a shallow dignity that made them all the more powerful. Neill's venom lent deep emotion to blunt statements based on distorted facts.⁷ Since these men played on the kind of patriotism that vilifies a minority strongly identified with an enemy, Shoyama knew that they might incite violence against Japanese Canadians. He knew also that they would be incredibly difficult to stop, for arguments alone were useless against them. Such men were successful because they appealed not to logic, but to fear: fear of economic competition, fear of social disruption and intermarriage, and fear for personal and national security.⁸

For seventy years the anti-asian movement had exploited the fears of those in real or imagined competition with Asians. The racists succeeded because Asians were paid lower wages than their white counterparts. By working for less, the racists argued, Asians undermined white living standards. At the same time the obvious solution – equal pay for equal work – was unthinkable since Asians, by definition, were inferior and therefore must be paid less. Yet while theoretically inferior, Asians were considered unfair competition because they were superior workers. To counteract the debilitating effects of their lower wage, Asians worked longer hours and had higher productivity than their white counterparts. To the labour agitators, compensating for a low wage with high productivity was an unfair tactic.⁹ Damned for having a lower standard of living and damned for working hard in order to raise it, Asians were locked into a double standard. Their only escape required the cooperation of those who feared them most: their competitors.

20世紀を通じて、経済的な理由による白人のアジア系カナダ人に対する反感は、アジア系カナダ人は白人社会に同化出来ないという議論で増強された。人種差別主義者は、人種的に同質でなければ社会の安定はない、アジア人は遺伝的に、カナダ風生活様式と英国風な社会価値と制度を受け入れることは出来ないと主張した。排日扇動者達にとって、日本語学校や日系人の社会、宗教、経済関係の団体は活動目的の疑わしい組織であり、日系人が白人カナダ社会に同化出来ないという証明であった。白人は、アジア系カナダ人がカナダ国家に対する忠誠心を示して、白人たちと同じように考え、感じ、行動するのを見ても、これは祖国のスパイとしてうまくカナダ人の中に紛れ込んで生活しているだけだ、と馬鹿にした。要するに、アジア系カナダ人は見かけが白人と異なるから、白人と同じように感じることも考えることも出来ない、というのが白人の結論であった。

As Japan's status as a world power rose through the 1920s and 1930s, B.C.'s racists added to their arsenal of charges the "big lie" that Japanese Canadians were part of a long term conspiracy by Japan to absorb British Columbia. Convinced that an interracial world war was inevitable and that Japan would be the aggressor in that war, B.C.'s racists often portrayed Canada's Japanese minority as a fifth column of spies and saboteurs. As proof for their charges the agitators used the dual citizenship of the 二世. Ignoring the fact that almost every other first generation Canadian also held the right to citizenship in two countries, the agitators claimed that the dual citizenship of the 二世 meant that they would fight for Japan, not Canada, when put to the test, in the same way that an Englishman born in Japan would fight for England. The practice of sending children to Japan for part of their education and the use of Japanese government texts in the Japanese-language schools, they further charged, ensured the indoctrination of the young in preparation for the expected invasion by Japan. Similarly, the traditional role played by the Japanese consul in protesting discrimination against Japanese Canadians was cited as proof that he, as Japan's representative, controlled Japanese Canadians and directed a conspiracy to overthrow British Columbia society.

BC州の日系人の地理的分布も、人種差別主義者によれば日本の陰謀によるものであった。BC州の日系人22,000名のうち、バンクーバーのような都市部に住む人が54パーセントで、残りはフレーザー河流域の農地、海岸沿いの漁師町、パルプ工場のある町、内陸部の果樹園、鉱山、製材所などに分布していた。当然、軍事的な重要地点、例えば主要道路、水力発電用ダム、電話交換所、港などの近くに住む日系人もいた。これさえも、人種差別主義者は、軍事施設を制御しようとする日本の陰謀の一環だとした。¹⁰

The charges were absurd, but they hurt. In their pervasiveness they could not be ignored or dismissed as the mindless muttering of imbeciles. What perhaps hurt the most was that most of these racist lies contained a grossly distorted kernel of truth. It was true that Asians worked longer hours for lower wages than whites; it was equally true that the choice of equal pay for equal work was not theirs to make. It was true that the Asian minorities retained their own institutions and many of their customs; it was equally true that the institutions of the larger society were closed to Asians, necessitating the establishment of parallel social and economic arrangements. It was true that the 二世 attended Japanese-language school after regular classes and that they used textbooks from Japan; it was equally true that as long as they were restricted to employment within the Japanese community, the 二世 needed what little Japanese language they learned in those schools in order to earn a living. It was true that the Japanese consul in Vancouver was treated with respect and consulted on minority problems; it was equally true that until the formation of the CCF in 1932 Japanese Canadians had no other ally on which to call when faced with discrimination. ¹¹

1941年11月当時、ショーヤマが日系人の将来を悲観していたのには、もう一つ理由があった。それは日系人は、自分たちに対するカナダ人の怒りにどう対処したらよいか、全く準備が出来ていなかったことである。日系人はカナダ社会のマイノリティでまとまりがなく、BC州のあちこちに分散して生活していた不安定な人達だった。毎日の生活に追われ、カナダ人一般の怒りに対処する方法を知らない人達だった。それまでの日系人に対する人種差別は個別に起きていたので、日系人はその都度ごとに、差別の対象になった当事者だけで対処してきた。日本領事の助けを借りることも多かった。1920年代に日系人漁師に対する漁業免許が制限された時は、日系人だけで誰が漁業を廃業するかを決定し、廃業した漁師の農業や商業への転換を助けた。また日本領事の支援を受けて、漁業免許制限に抗議する裁判を起こして勝訴した。日系人はカナダ社会から疎外されていたために、それぞれの小さなコミュニティーで社会、文化、経済組織を作って生活を維持した。林業と製材業では、日系人労働者は白人労働者の労働組合に入れないので、自分たちの労働組合を作った。連邦政府が日系人の選挙権を承認しないとわかると、選挙権獲得に一番熱心な二世が集まって、「日系カナダ市民連盟（Japanese Canadian Citizens’ League：JCCL）」を創立して選挙権獲得運動を始めた。日系人はこのように、人種差別にその都度別々に対処してきた。その結果、日系人社会の中に、社会、宗教、地理、信条、世代などに基づいたいろいろな組織があり、組織のリーダーはお互いを知ってはいたが、それぞれの組織は独立していた。また1941年以前には、これらの組織をまとめて対処しなければならないような緊急な問題もなかった。

While the multitude of Japanese Canadian associations gave the appearance of a well-organized, tightly knit community, none could lead the minority by itself. The most successful, the Canadian Japanese Association (CJA), had several strikes against it. Its 4,000 members were almost entirely 一世, and much of its authority had traditionally rested in its relationship with the Japanese consul, who would be discredited in the event of war. The CJA, a conservative group dominated by urban businessmen, had defended Japanese aggression in China in the early 1930s. While it had compensated for this error in public relations with strong Victory Bond drives after 1940, it remained tainted in the eyes of those Japanese Canadians who opposed Japan's militarist government. Among the 一世, the strongest antimilitarist group was the socialist Japanese Camp and Mill Workers Union. The Union, however, was too small and too ideologically radical to lead Japanese Canadians as a whole.¹²

第二次世界大戦後、 二世 organizations were equally ill-coordinated. Only 5,000 of the, 13,600 二世 in Canada were over twenty years of age in 1941. Those 5,000 二世 belonged to fifty-three 二世 organizations, of which the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League (JCCL) was the most vocal although not necessarily the most representative. Its leaders were mostly highly acculturated 二世 like Shoyama, who had been raised in white neighbourhoods outside the Powell Street area in Vancouver or the fishing villages along the coast. At the same time, the bulk of the membership came from Powell Street and places like Steveston and the Fraser Valley farming communities where the JCCL locals were run like traditional Japanese youth clubs.¹³ Divided within by 二世Kibei cultural conflicts, and socially and economically dependent on their immigrant parents, the 二世 were too young and too inexperienced to lead the Japanese minority in time of crisis. Rent by ideological, cultural and generational divisions, Japanese Canadians were effectively leaderless in November 1941.

ショーヤマは日系人に対する暴力や器物破壊行為を危惧していたが、日系人の将来については楽観的であった。ショーヤマは新聞と政府を信用していて、日系人の危機の際には、きっと新聞と政府は責任ある対応をすると信じていた。実際、1941年を通してBC州の新聞は、「日系人問題」については低姿勢を保っていた。当時、ショーヤマは連邦警察（RCMP）が介入して、新聞の人種差別的態度を抑制しているとは知る由もなかった。¹⁴

トーマス・ショーヤマは、カナダ首相のウィリアム・ライオン・マッケンジー・キングとキングのアジア政策顧問のほとんどが、アジア系カナダ人の保護に関しては頼りにならない人達であったことも知らなかった。狡猾な政治家であったキングは、自分の人種差別意識を大衆の眼から隠していた。しかし死後公にされた日記から、キングの人種差別意識が明らかになった。1941年に68才であったキングは、ビクトリア朝後期の産物であった。そして、この時代の心理的特徴である人種差別意識とコンプレックスを持っていたが、慎重に作り上げた世間体の後ろに隠して表面には出さなかった。キングは世間的には、ビクトリア朝時代の英国首相ウィリアム・グラッドストン風の自由主義を標榜し、民間企業を擁護し、恵まれない人達に寛容な人間を演じた。しかし私人としては、信条と言えるものは何も持っていなかった。キングの行動規範は、その時々に自由党に有利になる政策を取る、ということであった。そして自分を党首とする自由党だけがカナダを治めることが出来る、と堅く信じていた。そのため、キングの意見はその時々の政治状況で変わり、流動的であった。1937年からキングが引退する1948年まで、キングの首席秘書官を務めたジャック・W・ピッカーズギルは、キングについて次のように語っている。

マッケンジー・キングについて一つだけ確かなことは、今日の意見が必ずしも明日の意見と同じではないことだ。キングは直感的な政治家だ。常に大衆の意見がどちらに動くかを直感的に判断していた。キングは自分の信条に殉じる殉教者ではない。¹⁵

1941年当時のキングの政敵の一人、CCF議員のトミー・ダグラス（後にサスカチュワン州協同連邦党党首、連邦新民主党党首）は、もっと単刀直入にキングを次のように評している。

キングの座右の銘は、国際政治でも国内政治でも現状を壊すようなことはしない、ということだ。他の人たちがどのような行動をとるかわかるまで、自分から決して動かない、そして多数派が分かってから多数派に参加するのである。マキアベリアン風政治家の素晴らしい手本である。キングは生涯に一度も、自分の立場を他人に先立って表明したことはない。常に75パーセントの大衆が自分を支持することを確かめ、それが判明してから多数派に参加してその旗振り役になった。¹⁶

1941年11月まで、キングはこのような策略を用いて15年間権力の座を維持してきた。この間、キングは自分の政府を完全に掌握していた。キングの政府は、日系人を漁業から締め出そうと試み、中国からの移民を停止し、日本からの移民を1年150名に制限し、「日系カナダ市民連盟（JCCL）」からの強い要請にも関わらず、アジア系カナダ人に選挙権を与えることを拒否した。

Yet in spite of this record of discrimination, King's public image as a tolerant and reasonable man remained intact. In January 1941 Shoyama, like many Japanese Canadians, firmly believed that "the Prime Minister is not the type of man to be swayed by prejudice or irrational emotion."¹⁷ In reality King was very susceptible, not to "prejudice and irrational emotion" per se, but to the voting power they represented. It is Jack Pickersgill's opinion that "King, in his heart, did not approve of the [Japanese] policies…. He recognized that opinion in British Columbia, that counted as far as votes were concerned, could not be ignored."¹⁸ King's willingness to recognize prejudiced public opinion for the sake of the votes it represented was compounded by his own prejudices. His diary reveals a distaste for the admission to the Commonwealth of India "with its black [sic] leaders." King's attitude toward the Japanese is best shown by his comment following the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. "It is fortunate," he wrote in his diary, "that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than upon the white races of Europe."¹⁹

The public views of King's advisors, the Standing Committee on Orientals, were also not as they appeared. Those advisors had impressed Shoyama with their "sincere desire to apply reason and good sense to meet this tragic and delicate issue,"²⁰ were also not as they appeared. The Standing Committee on Orientals had been created in 1940 to advise the federal government on Asian matters. It was composed of five British Columbians: Professor Henry F. Angus of the University of British Columbia, Assistant Commissioner Frederick J. Mead of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Lieutenant Colonel A.W. Sparling of the Department of National Defence, Mayor F.J. Hume of New Westminster, and Lt. Col. Macgregor Macintosh, a xenophobic Conservative. With the exception of Macintosh, whose anti-Asian sentiments were well known, Shoyama had reason to be satisfied with this committee. Angus was an outspoken liberal who had championed the 二世 cause throughout the 1930s at considerable personal risk. Mead was the RCMP's security expert, a highly regarded professional openly supportive of Japanese Canadians. Hume, while a politician, had a reputation as a moderate on Asian matters, as had Sparling.²¹ With Angus and Mead to balance Macintosh's racist position, the Standing Committee on Orientals in November 1941 appeared sympathetic to the problems facing Japanese Canadians.

Unfortunately neither Hume nor Sparling were as benign as they appeared. Hume, as a politician, could not be depended upon to remain neutral if the fate of Japanese Canadians became a political issue. More importantly, Sparling had already played a significant role in preventing the enlistment of Asians into the armed forces in 1940. Despite his mild public posture Sparling was strongly opposed to the enlistment of Asian Canadians. His reasons remain unclear, although a statement to army intelligence in 1944 suggests that he believed Japanese Canadians to be disloyal and that the enlistment of Asians would lead to racial incidents in the armed forces. In 1940 Sparling had found himself the sole opponent to Asian enlistment on the federally appointed Special Committee on Orientals. The other members of that committee (Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, an Assistant Under-Secretary at the Department of External Affairs; Dr. George Sansom, a professor of Asian studies at Columbia University; and Asst. Comnr. Frederick J. Mead of the RCMP) all strongly supported the enlistment of Asians, Keenleyside and Sansom in principle, Mead because in his professional opinion Japanese Canadians were loyal and lawabiding. Indeed, as the RCMP officer responsible for security in British Columbia, Mead was principally concerned with minimizing the effects of rabble-rousing by extremists like Vancouver's Alderman Halford Wilson.²² Sparling, representing the Department of National Defence on the committee, thought Keenleyside was pro-Japanese and that Mead was naive to judge Japanese Canadians by the impeccability of their past conduct. Aware that Keenleyside, Mead and Sansom would recommend that Asians be permitted to enlist, Sparling took his opinions directly to the one man he knew could stop the enlistment of Asians: the Minister of Pensions and Health and M.P. for Vancouver Centre, the Honourable Ian Alistair Mackenzie.²³

イアン・アリステアー・マッケンジーは話題に富む人物だった。スコットランド出身を誇りにし、スコットランド訛りの強い英語を話した。連邦議員に選出されて初めて議会で演説した時、あまりにスコットランド訛りの強い英語だったので、他の議員からカナダの公用語の英語とフランス語以外で演説をしたと揶揄されたことがある。1941年までにマッケンジーは際立った経歴を積んでいた。1914年にカナダに移民してBC州に住んだが、カナダに移民する前にスコットランドで、西洋古典学、ゲーリック語とその文学の研究者として賞を受賞した。またエディンバラ大学法学部を主席で卒業した。BC州に1年住んだ後にカナダ派遣軍に入隊し^訳注i、第一次世界大戦ではイープル、ケンメル、ソンムの戦役で戦功を挙げた。その後1919年に退役してBC州に戻るまで、J.D.スチュワート将軍の率いるカナダ軍統合参謀本部に勤務していた。

マッケンジーはBC州に戻って18ヶ月後にBC州議会議員に選出され、その長い政治家としての新しい人生を始めた。それから9年後、BC州政府の官房長官を務めてから、マッケンジー・キングの自由党連邦政府の移民・植民・復員兵再定着・先住民大臣の職を受諾して、州政治から連邦政治に鞍替えした。1930年の連邦選挙で自由党は負けたが、マッケンジーはバンクーバー・センター地区で当選し、自由党の影の内閣の一員なり、議会の駆け引きに長けていることを示した。次の1935年の連邦選挙では自由党が勝ち、マッケンジーも200票の差で辛くも当選した。マッケンジーはこの自由党内閣で国防大臣になったが、第二次世界大戦の勃発と共に年金・保健大臣に更迭された。²⁴

A personable bachelor, Ian Mackenzie had three flaws: he was fond of alcohol, he was not a strong administrator, and he was, in the words of his close friend, Conservative M.P. and future Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, "somewhat unreasonable" about Asians.²⁵ David Lewis, CCF National Secretary in 1941 and future leader of the New Democratic Party, was more blunt in his recollections. "Ian Mackenzie," he recalled, "was a racist, pure and simple."²⁶ Mackenzie was the impetus behind the Liberal party's anti-asian campaigns in British Columbia. He was a man who had no qualms about associating himself with hate literature that employed every lie and innuendo in the arsenal of the White Canada Association, literature with slogans like: "A Vote for ANY C.C.F. Candidate is a VOTE TO GIVE the CHINAMAN and JAPANESE the same Voting Right that you have!"²⁷

By 1941 Mackenzie had been in politics for twenty-one years. In that entire time, with one notable exception,²⁸ he had endorsed every anti-asian proposal raised in the Legislative Assembly, in Parliament and in Cabinet.

マッケンジーは、BC州ではあからさまなアジア人排斥主義を掲げて選挙運動をしたが、オタワに移ってからは、人種差別主義は表に出さず、裏で狡猾な手段を使って同様なことをした。これは、やはり狡猾に目立たずに政治を仕切ることを好むキング首相との親しい友人関係を保つためであった。第一次世界大戦と第二次世界大戦の戦間期に、イアン・マッケンジーは声高なアジア人排斥主義の宣伝はニールやリードといった政治家にまかせ、自分のアジア人排斥主義はBC州の特殊事情のためにやむを得ない政治的な判断に過ぎない、と同僚の議員たちに思わせていた。マッケンジーはオタワでは、自分のアジア人排斥主義を表に出さないように社会的に気をつけることによって、ディーフェンベーカー（後にカナダの人種的マイノリティの擁護者を名乗るようになる）のような人物との友情を保っていた。

The views Mackenzie did express in Ottawa were often only more explicit versions of the underlying prejudices and presumptions of his colleagues. The fact that nonwhites had fewer rights than whites in Canadian society does not appear to have unduly disturbed any of his Cabinet colleagues in 1941. It was a social fact and accepted as such. Most of his colleagues probably felt, as one would later argue, that the role of government was to conform to the existing social fact in racial matters, not to lead the campaign to change that fact.²⁹ In Ottawa, where Asians were considered only as a minor B.C. matter, Mackenzie was seen as a colourful war hero, a liberal in economic matters, a champion of veterans' rights, and, most importantly, a first-class player in the game of politics.

Mackenzie's successful use of anti-Asian tactics against the CCF in the 1935 election had convinced him that Asian enlistment must be quashed or he would lose his seat to the CCF in the next election. Mackenzie knew that Asian enlistment could undermine him in two ways. Not only would the enlistment of Asians enfranchise a portion of the Asians in his Vancouver Centre constituency, who could be expected to vote CCF, but Asian enlistment might well alienate his support among anti-asian veterans' groups, diverting their votes to the equally anti-asian Conservatives. As a political strategist Mackenzie was unwilling to expose himself, and his party, to the pro-asian charges he had been leveling against the CCF. Consequently, in the privacy of the Cabinet, Mackenzie, reinforced by Sparling's expertise as a representative of the Department of National Defence, supported the political appeals of B.C. Liberal Premier T. Duff Pattullo,³⁰ to quash Asian enlistment.

連邦政府内閣の密室の中で、マッケンジーはアジア系カナダ人政策を牛耳っていたが、これはマッケンジーが世間で言われているような影響力を内閣で持っていたわけではない。それどころか、内閣の中の序列と影響力は弱かった。マッケンジーには事務能力が弱いという欠点があり、このため第二次世界大戦が始まると同時に、国防大臣から年金・保健大臣に更迭された。マッケンジーの閣僚内の影響力は、キング首相との密接な関係に依存していた。マッケンジーはキング首相に、自分はBC州出身のただ一人の大臣であり、政治戦略家として名声を博していると強調した。内閣は日系人問題はBC州の問題であり、連邦政治に対する影響はごく限られている、と見なしていた。そして日系人問題は、政治的に抜け目のないBC州出身のマッケンジーに任せておけば良いと考えた。実際、閣僚の中で日系人問題に少しでも関心を持っていたのはマッケンジーただ一人であった。

政府の日系人問題に対する態度は、漁業大臣であったJ.E.ミッショードに端的に現れている。1940年にミッショードは、日系人漁業許可証の制限処置を継続するかどうかについて、マッケンジーに次の手紙を書いた。ちなみに当時の日系人漁師はカナダ国籍を獲得していた一世か、またはカナダ生まれでカナダ国籍を持つ二世であった。

私は日本人を祖先とする英国臣民に対して、漁業許可証の発行数を制限してきた恣意的な規則を正当化することは難しいとずっと思ってきました。特に今年はカナダがヨーロッパ戦線で、自由と人権を守るためにナチス・ドイツと戦っています。それなのにカナダは国内で、ヒットラーがチェコ人、スロバキア人、ポーランド人に対して用いたのと同様な差別政策を、日本人を祖先とする英国臣民に対して用いています。これは本当に理解に苦しみます。勿論、あなたも時が来れば、私の現在の立場を理解してくれるだろうと思うので、現在はあなたの意見を参考にするつもりです。³¹

While offended by the racism behind the policy of denying fishing licences to Japanese Canadians, Michaud was unwilling to act on his moral convictions. Instead, he was content to accept an immoral but politically expedient policy if the responsibility for that policy was assumed by someone else. No doubt Michaud and his colleagues agreed with Prime Minister King's view that "it was necessary to have the fundamental principles but their application in relation to both time and space was the essence of politics."³² In the politically sensitive area of Japanese Canadian policy, "liberals" like Michaud were content to shunt the moral responsibility onto Ian Mackenzie, the main engineer of Japanese Canadian policy.

以前から、敵性外国人が仮釈放されたときは拘留施設から出所できることになっているが、BC州の日本国籍を持つ住民にこの規則を適用することは、治安の観点から見て疑問がある。また日系人に対する不安感が大きくなっている状況では、たとえカナダ国籍を持つ日系人でも騒ぎを起こさないとは言えない。それ故、これら日系人はカナダ国籍の有無にかかわらず、先ずは行動を制限し、後に民主的権利を制限する処置を取ることは妥当であり、BC州民もそれを望んでいると思われる。日本人を祖先に持つカナダ人は、日本に対して忠誠で、カナダに対しては敵意を持っているかもしれない。国防省は将来、BC州だけでも日系人10,000名余りを拘留するための施設を提供することになるかもしれない³⁴。

While acknowledging that enemy aliens were the concern of another department, the RCMP, LaFleche offers no explanation for his presumption that Japanese Canadians were disloyal. Given also that no internal security officer was appointed to the Pacific Command until 1940,³⁵ it appears that LaFleche was repeating his Minister=s personal prejudices and that these prejudices served as a basis for government policy. Given also that there were only 2,000 adult male Japanese aliens in Canada in 1938, the 10,000figure in the above letter suggests that the possibility of incarcerating Canadian citizens of Japanese ancestry in the event of war had already crossed Ian Mackenzie's mind.

1939年2月に、連邦政府官僚たちは、再び日系人の運命について、「外国人及びその資産処理に関する省際委員会」で討議した。この委員会は外国人についてだけの討議に限定されていたが、次のような結論を出した。

もしカナダがアジアのある強国と戦争になる時は、BC州のカナダ市民および他のアジア系市民の、このアジアの交戦国出身の市民対する感情を考慮して、これら敵性外国人のほぼ全てを強制収容する必要を進言することになるだろう。強制収容は敵性外国人によるスパイ行為や妨害工作を防ぐだけでなく、その資産をBC州民による破壊や略奪から守るためにも必要である。³⁶

この結論からわかることは、BC州民の感情を誰がどのようにして調べるのか、という問題はともかく、真珠湾攻撃のほぼ３年前に、連邦政府高官の中に既に敵性日系人〈日本国籍者〉は強制収容すべきだ、と結論していた人達がいたということである。

However, the civil service was very much divided on the Japanese question. Some departments were strongly anti-japanese. For instance, in 1938 the Department of Labour based a report on economic competition between Asians and whites on information supplied by the White Canada Association, a virulently anti-asian group. As a consequence, the report officially endorsed the undocumented allegations of the White Canada Association that Asians were "pushing" whites out of certain businesses and were "deliberately depressing the prices of berries, vegetables and poultry to do so."³⁷ At the same time the Department of Fisheries proposed a four-year program to drive Japanese Canadians from the fishing industry by withholding fishing licenses, even though all Japanese Canadian fishermen were Canadian nationals.³⁸

日系人を擁護した省庁もあった。日系人擁護の主要な省庁が外国との関係を扱う外務省であったいうことは、当時の連邦政府は日系人をカナダ人として見ていなかったということを示している。外務省で最も日系人擁護を明白に主張したのは、1941年当時43歳で米国および極東アジア担当の次官補だったヒュー・キンリーサイド博士であった。キンリーサイドはBC州生まれで、バンクーバーの両親の家には様々な人種のカナダ人が訪れていた。子供の時にこのような環境で育ったキンリーサイドは、自由主義者になっていったが、ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学とマサチューセッツ州のクラーク大学で学んだ経験がその自由主義を更に育んだ。キンリーサイドは1929年から1936年まで、東京のカナダ公使館で一等書記官を務めた。この時に日本文化の理解を深めたが、この経験が1938年に「日本人不法移民審理委員会（Board of Inquiry into Illegal Japanese Immigration）」、1940年にアジア系カナダ人のカナダ軍入隊を審議した「アジア系カナダ人に関する特別委員会（Special Committee on Orientals）」の委員長を務めた時に役立った。³⁹

私的な場所でも公の場所でもキンリーサイドは、政府のアジア系カナダ人政策を改善する努力を続け、全てのカナダ人が同等の権利を持つことを推進した。キンリーサイドは戦前他にも、「アジア系カナダ人に関する省際委員会（Interdepartmental Committee on Orientals）」や「カナダ・米国国防常設委員会（Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board of Defense）」に参加していた。後者は民間人と軍人から構成され、カナダと米国の国防計画を調整するのが目的であった。

In November 1941, as a member of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, Keenleyside helped to defuse "a vigorous effort…by certain members of the Board to put through a resolution urging the Governments [of Canada and the United States] to deport or to place in custody those Ôelements in the population of Japanese racial origin' [in the event of hostilities with Japan]."⁴⁰ When the "more moderate counsel" of men like Keenleyside prevailed, the board recommended merely that "the two governments should follow policies of a similar character" with respect to their Japanese populations and that a "coincidence of policy" would be useful.⁴¹ Keenleyside's insistence that governments should practice the principles to which they paid lip-service, however, did not always endear him to his superiors.

His immediate superior, fellow British Columbian Norman Robertson, sympathized with Keenleyside's position but was not prepared to take such a firm stand. As Prime Minister King's Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,^C in 1941, the thirty-seven-year-old Robertson was aware that King would not tolerate for long an underling who openly opposed his views – even on what King considered a minor matter like the Japanese question. Accordingly, Robertson used subtler methods than Keenleyside. Although the Japanese question was only a small part of his duties, Robertson took pains to arrange that the racists nominated by Ian Mackenzie for committees investigating Asians were balanced by liberals, and to advise King on Asian matters in a way that appeared to support King's views while injecting cautionary and moderating ideas.⁴²

外務省の自由主義者には、RCMPとカナダ軍の高級官僚に大事な仲間がいた。RCMPで日系人の擁護をした主要人物は、副長官のフレデリック・ジョン・ミードだった。ミードはイングランド生まれで、第一次世界大戦以前にカナダ北西騎馬警察官（Royal North-West Mounted Police）になり、一警官から出発して1938年には副長官まで昇進していた。皆に尊敬されていた警察幹部で、カナダ中の連邦警察署で勤務し、警察業務に精通していた。1941年までにミードは、RCMPの治安問題の第一人者になっていた。特に共産主義者の反政府活動に詳しかった。⁴³

It was probably in his capacity as an expert in Communist insurgency that Mead first met his main contact with the Japanese minority, Etsuji Morii. Morii was a controversial figure in the Powell Street ghetto in Vancouver. He had, Mead reported, thwarted an attempt by Communists to organize the Japanese fishermen in the 1930s.⁴⁴ Morii was an ideal contact as far as the RCMP was concerned. He had a great deal of influence within the ghetto community but was not so respectable as to be unwilling or unable to undertake distasteful tasks in order to protect Japanese Canadians. Morii was both respected and despised by his fellow Japanese Canadians, with the divisions usually falling along generational and ideological lines. The 一世, who had lived through the rough pioneer period of Vancouver's history around the turn of the century, usually treated him with respect. They saw him as a product of that age. Morii had arrived in Canada in 1906 at a time when the Japanese population was composed almost entirely of men who worked in seasonal labouring occupations and who had all too often gambled away their earnings in Chinatown. Reasoning that it was better that Japanese lose their money to other Japanese, Morii founded a social club where men could drink and gamble without the dangers that sometimes accompanied gambling in Chinatown.⁴⁵ With the arrival of women after 1910 and the evolution of the B.C. Japanese community into a respectable, family-based entity, Morii assumed the role of a "padrone" within the ghetto. He funded martial arts schools from the proceeds of his clubs to promote the Japanese warrior ethic of bushido among the young and to provide young men with a socially acceptable outlet for their energies. He contributed heavily to community drives and organized many of them. He gained a reputation among the 一世 as a man who would send a portion of a gambler's losses to his wife so that the gambler's family would not suffer unduly. He made his clubs available at a nominal fee to groups like the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League so as not to tax their limited budgets.

Different factions within the Vancouver ghetto reacted to Morii's transformation from a gangster to a padrone in different ways. To Christian 二世, who had been taught that gambling was a sin, Morii remained a gangster, out of step with the respectable Christian image they wished their community to have. To the socialist 一世, Morii was a fascist who promoted the Japanese warrior ethic. To most other 一世 in the ghetto, who regarded gambling as a normal part of Japanese culture and the prohibition movement as an amusing aspect of white society, Morii was a man who had assumed useful and necessary roles within the community,⁴⁶ the most necessary probably being that of a protector. In this role he stood between the Japanese community and the larger society to prevent unpleasant situations from rebounding on Japanese Canadians. This was the role he assumed with the RCMP, a protecting intermediary contact.

How the role of protector worked is best shown by the way Morii handled Keenleyside's Board of Inquiry in 1938. That inquiry had been intended to defuse extremist charges that a Japanese army was being smuggled into B.C. Complications arose from the fact that the Washington-British Columbia border had been extremely porous around the turn of the century. The immigrants, both Japanese and non-Japanese, often had no idea for some time after their arrival that Amerika contained two distinct nations. Since they intended to stay only a few years, the formalities of immigration seemed vague and unimportant. By 1938 – and the age of passports and tight immigration – however, 一世 who had entered Canada from across the U.S. border were technically illegal immigrants.

It fell to Morii, as padrone of the community, to minimize the effects of the inquiry. Few 一世 were prepared to trust that the government would allow them to stay, even though they had been in Canada for over thirty years. More importantly, B.C. racists would be sure to use the existence of an appreciable number of illegal immigrants, even middle-aged ones, as fuel for their anti-Japanese propaganda. Morii accordingly accepted the task of liaising between the inquiry and the Japanese community. In that capacity he supplied a number of the middle-aged illegal immigrants with the name and landing date of a ship whose manifest listed the number and not the names of the Japanese immigrants aboard. Other illegal immigrants chose to retire to Japan rather than try to persuade the authorities to let them stay. In the end only twenty-four were deported.⁴⁷

The RCMP knew of Morii's gambling connections. They also knew that he had been acquitted of murder in the 1920s. It was more important to them that there had been no complaints against him since that time, and that he seemed to be held in high esteem by the Japanese community at large. That esteem was reflected in his position on the executives of the Canadian Japanese Association and the Japanese Welfare Society, and by his role as coordinator of the 1940 Red Feather and Victory Bond drives among Japanese Canadians. The RCMP also knew that Morii's influence among the 一世 was such that he had been called in by the San Francisco Japanese community to mediate strife within that community in 1936. That fact, and the manner in which he had handled the Board of Inquiry, had impressed the RCMP.⁴⁸ What mattered most to them was that Morii appeared to know everything that went on in the Japanese community in B.C. and to be in a position to stop any potential subversion.

モリイはRCMPに対して真実を一切隠さなかった。モリイは、日系人の中には日本陸軍と海軍の軍人だったものもいるが、全員徴兵された者であり、敵性外国人と見なすことは出来ない、と真実を訴えた。日系人の中には「血気に満ちた愚か者がいて、過激な事を言うかもしれないが、決してカナダ社会に害になるような行動はさせない」と保証した。特にモリイは、日系人は市会議員ウィルソンのような人種差別主義者の挑発に乗らず、冷静に対応してきた完璧な経歴を持っていると強調した。1940年にモリイはRCMP長官のS.T.ウッドに、「日系人は自分たちの将来は、カナダ人全般の将来と深く結びついており、カナダ人全般の利益が日系人の利益だ」と断言した。⁴⁹

Mead concurred. "No fear of sabotage need be expected from the Japanese in Canada," Mead reported to RCMP Commissioner in 1940. "I feel this is a broad statement, at the same time I know it to be true." Mead was prepared to accept Morii's assurances that "no untoward incident would happen… should hostilities develop as a result of the strained relations now existing between Great Britain and the Japanese empire."⁵⁰ The greatest danger, Mead felt, lay in the "provocative and at times like these, downright dangerous agitation" by anti-Japanese individuals like Vancouver's Alderman Halford Wilson.

In the military, the Chief of General Staff in 1940, Major General H.G.D. Crerar, agreed with Mead,⁵¹ as did his successor, Maj. Gen. Ken Stuart, and Stuart's Vice-Chief, Lieutenant General Maurice A. Pope. "At no point during the war or before it," Pope would recall, "had I worried about the presence of the Japanese, fellow citizens or otherwise, on the Pacific Coast."⁵² Stuart was equally convinced that Japanese Canadians were loyal. "From the army point of view," he informed Pope after the outbreak of the Pacific War, "I cannot see that Japanese Canadians constitute the slightest menace to national security."⁵³

日系人にとって不幸だったことは、これらカナダ軍隊の高官の見解が、キング首相にとって重要ではなかった、ということである。1940年8月という早い時点で、キングは参謀本部の「日本軍によるカナダ太平洋沿岸の侵略は不可能である」という査定を冷笑した。この査定をBC州首相のダフ・パチューロに送るにあたって、キングは「これはカナダ軍の公式な査定であるが、私はあなたと同様に、アジア人に関した事柄は何事も額面どおりに受け入れてはいけないと思っている」と伝えてい。⁵⁴ 1941年11月までに、キングのカナダ軍高官に対する不信感は、徴集兵を海外に派遣するか否かをめぐる意見の対立で強まっていた。キングは、カナダは空軍、海軍、国内の工業製品の生産だけで、第二次世界大戦に貢献すべきであると信じてい。⁵⁵ 一方1941年までに英国の戦略家は、ナチドイツに占領されたヨーロッパに進攻する作戦を練っていた。この時点で、米国はまだ中立を保っていたので、英国は米国の支援ではなく英連邦と英国植民地から大量の支援を期待していた。英連邦の一員としてカナダは、陸軍4師団の参戦を期待されていた。1941年7月に「内閣戦時委員会（War Cabinet Committee）」は、海外派遣軍4師団と国内防衛軍2師団の編成を許可した。しかし海外派兵の４師団の兵員をどのように集めるかが問題であった。軍部とキング政府防衛大臣J.L.ラルストンの両者とも徴兵制を望んだ。

しかしキング首相は、徴兵制を導入して徴集兵を海外に派遣すれば、徴兵制に反対のケベック州で自由党は壊滅してしまうと危惧した。連邦自由党議員の約3分の1はケベック州選出の議員であった。1941年11月、キング首相は、なにがあってもカナダ軍の計画を阻止して、徴兵制の導入だけは避けようと決断した。

キング首相は同じく1941年11月に、カナダ太平洋岸の防衛に危険があれば、これはほんの少しではあるが徴集兵の海外派遣反対に有利に働くと考えた。「太平洋戦争が起こればカナダ軍をカナダ太平洋岸に配備することになり、ヨーロッパに徴集兵を送る余裕がなくなる」とキング首相が言ったと伝えられている。⁵⁶ 1941年から1942年にかけての冬に、キングは自分の徴兵制導入反対に不利になるような参謀本部の勧告を受け入れる気持ちはなかった。

1941年11月までに、将来の日系人の運命を決定する舞台は整っていた。当時のカナダの政治状況で、非白人マイノリティが、白人と同様の人権を持たなければならいという議論は、政治的に危険なことであった。日系人は、連邦政府が自分たちの人権を守ってくれると信じていた。しかし連邦政府が既に日系人の期待を裏切る政策の準備を整えていたことも、連邦政府の日系人政策が一人の人種差別主義的政治家の手に委ねられていたことも、日系人は知らなかった。RCMPとカナダ軍高官は日系人を擁護したが、日系人の運命を決定する政治家の中には、一人として日系人を擁護するものはいなかったのである。

訳注
I. 第二次世界大戦中のカナダは英連邦の一部であり、カナダ軍は英国軍の支配下に置かれると同時に米国との軍事協力体制も維持していた。カナダの海外派遣軍はCanadian Expeditionary Forceとよばれた。（戻る）
II. カナダ政府は第二次世界大戦中に、戦時公債を発行した。この戦時公債は戦勝公債（Victory Bond）とよばれた。（戻る）

注

A. 1941年にカナダ生まれの日系人が13,600人いた。帰加二世の数は推定出来ないが、1,500人の学齢児童が日本で学校に通っていた。これは全日系カナダ人学齢児童の14パーセントにあたる。（戻る）

1. ショーヤマは1945年にカナダ軍のS-20情報部隊に入隊するまで 『ニュー・カナディアン』 紙英語版の編集長をしていた。除隊後、サスカチュワン州政府経済発展審議会執行委員長になる。1960年代に連邦政府財務省に移り、1971年に財務省次官になるまで昇進を続けた。 第二次世界大戦前のBC州の人種間関係の負の側面は次の著書に詳しい。W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia,, Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1978. （戻る）
2. See Patricia E. Roy, "The Oriental ÔMenace' in British Columbia," Studies in Canadian Social History, edited by Michel Horn and Ronald Saborin. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974, p.292参照。 （戻る）
3. For a full account of the 二世 dilemma, see Ken Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976.; F.E. La Violette, The Canadian Japanese in World War II. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948.; and C.H. Young, H.R. Reid and W.A. Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1939. （戻る）
4. 『ニュー・カナディアン』, 21 November 1941. （戻る）
5. Ibid.（戻る）
6. このような例としては、 C.E. Hope and W.K. Earle, “The Oriental Threat,” Maclean's; J.E. Sears, "Orientals and the C.C.F.: A Radio Address," 4 October 1935, Angus MacInnis Collection, Box 41, UBC Archives; and 『ニュー・カナディアン』, 14 February 1941.（戻る）

B. 協同連邦党 (CCP)、後の新民主党 （戻る）

7. このような排日カナダ人議員の言動には次の例がある。Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Elections and Franchise Acts, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 11 March 1937. （戻る）
8. カナダ太平洋岸のアジア人排斥感情の歴史は次を参照のこと。Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion,Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966; and John Higham, Patterns of American Nativism, 1; and John Higham, 860-1925,New York: Antheneum, 1975. 上の二つは日系アメリカ人の経験についてであるが、日系カナダ人の経験にも関係している。日系人の人種差別の歴史は前掲 Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was. （戻る）
9. BC州の白人がアジア系カナダ人を恐れていたのは、アジア系カナダ人が労働で自分たちより優れていると思ったからで、アジア系カナダ人が労働で劣っていると思ったからではないという議論は次を参照のこと。Patricia E. Roy, "British Columbia's Fear of Asians: 1900-1950," Social History, pp. 161-72. （戻る）
10. 日系人に対する人種差別的な宣伝工作については次を参照のこと。Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was; and La Violette, The Canadian Japanese. （戻る）
11. 日本領事館の歴史的に果たした役割については次を参照のこと。 M.A. Sunahara, “Historical Leadership Trends Among Japanese Canadians: 1940-1950,” Canadian Ethnic Studies, pp. 1-16; Yuji Ichioka, "Japanese Associations and the Japanese Government, " Pacific Historical Review, pp. 409-37; and Roger Daniels, "The Japanese," in John Higham, ed., Ethnic Leadership in America, pp. 39-45. （戻る）
12. Sunahara, “Historical Leadership Trends”; M.A. Sunahara, “Federal Policy and the Japanese Canadians,”M.A. thesis; and J.M. Read, “The Prewar Japanese Canadians of Maple Ridge,” M.A. thesisを参照。 （戻る）
13. インタビュー JCCLの指導者。 （戻る）
14. カナダ軍諜報部によるRCMP副長官F.J.ミードとのインタビュー　Microreel 629A, “Evacuation of Japanese,” Provincial Archives of British Columbia (PABC). （戻る）
15. インタビュー J.W. Pickersgill, Ottawa, Ont. （戻る）
16. インタビュー Hon. T.C. Douglas, Ottawa, Ont. （戻る）
17. 『ニュー・カナディアン』, 10 January 1941. （戻る）
18. インタビュー J.W. Pickersgill. （戻る）
19. W.L.M. King Diary, W.L.M. King Papers, MG27J2, PAC, 6 August 1945. （戻る）
20. 『ニュー・カナディアン』, 21 November 1941. （戻る）
21. マッキントッシュは1938年に日系人全ての日本への送還を提唱した。Patricia E. Roy, “Educating the East,” B.C. Studies, pp. 64, 68. アンガスの視点は次を参照。Henry F. Angus, ʻʼLiberalism Stoops to Conquer,” Canadian Forum他の人たちの視点についてはH.L.キンリーサイド博士の意見によるところが大きい。 （戻る）
22. Report, Mead to Comnr. S.T. Wood, RCMP, 21 August 1940. Department of National Defence Papers, RG 24, vol. 2730, file HQS5199x, PAC. （戻る）
23. Report, Mead to Comnr. S.T. Wood, RCMP, 21 August 1940. Department of National Defence Papers, RG 24, vol. 2730, file HQS5199x, PAC. （戻る）
24. Who's Who in Canada. 1945; King Diary, 19 January 1946; Bruce Hutchinson, The Incredible Canadian: A Candid Portrait of Mackenzie King, Toronto: Longmans, 1970, p. 216; Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924-1932, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, pp. 332, 358; Vancouver Sun, 4 June 1938. （戻る）
25. インタビュー Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, Ottawa, Ont. （戻る）
26. インタビュー David Lewis, Ottawa, Ont. （戻る）
27. See Vancouver Sun, 7 October 1935; and Sears, "Orientals and the C.C.F." The latter is repeated in part in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 27 February 1936, p. 575. （戻る）
28. マッケンジーの日系人排斥政策の唯一の例外は、1929年、第一次世界大戦にカナダ兵として参戦したアジア系カナダ人に、BC州選挙権を与える法律を支持したことである。この時マッケンジーは、かつて自分が会長を務めたことがある第一次世界大戦退役軍人会の方針に従って賛成票を投じた。マッケンジーのアジア系カナダ人観については次を参照のこと。 The Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, vols. 24, 25 and 32, PAC. Many of these documents were written to political colleagues. マッケンジーの個人的見解については次を参照のこと。Robert England and Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker. 声明については次を参照。Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 17 December 1945, p. 3704. （戻る）
29. Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour, as quoted in Nisei Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2, 28 August 1945. （戻る）
30. パチューロがアジア系カナダ人の入隊は、アジア系カナダ人に選挙権を与えることになるので反対した経緯については次を参照のこと。the T.D. Pattullo Papers, Add MSS 3, vol. 75, PABC. （戻る）
31. J.E. Michaud to Ian Mackenzie, 17 January 1940, Ian Mackenzie Papers MG27IIIB5, vol. 19, file 29-7, PAC. （戻る）
32. J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol IV, 1947-1948. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970., p. 235. （戻る）
33. この委員会の委員は F.C. Blair, Director of Immigration (Chair); Inspector Armitage, RCMP; Dr. R.H. Coats, Dominion Bureau of Statistics; Lt. Gen. M.A. Pope, National Defence; P.L. Young, Customs and Excise; A.J. Whitmore, Fisheries; R.A. Rigg, Labour; O.D. Skelton and Dr. H.L. Keenleyside, External Affairs. （戻る）
34. L.R. Lafleche, Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence, to F.C. Blair, Director of Immigration, Ottawa, 2 June 1938, extract from HQS 7368, vol. 1, Microreel 629A, PABC. （戻る）
35. W.L.M. King to T.D. Pattullo, 21 August 1940, T.D. Pattullo Papers, Add MSS 3, vol. 75, file 8, PABC. （戻る）
36. Canada, Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property, First Interim Report, 9 February 1939, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27111B5, vol. 32, file X52, p. 2., PAC. （戻る）
37. Rigg to Interdepartmental Committee on Orientals, Extract from HQS 7368, vol. 1, folio 39 on Microreel 629A, PABC. （戻る）
38. Report, Whitmore to Interdepartmental Committee on Orientals, extracted from HQS 7368, vol. 1, folio 50 on Microreel 629A, PABC. （戻る）
39. Who's Who in Canada, 1945; インタビュー H.L. Keenleyside, Victoria, B.C. For the general view of Keenleysideʼs Division, see Escott Reid, “The Conscience of a Diplomat,ʼʼ Queen's Quarterly, pp. 574-89. （戻る）
40. H.L. Keenleyside, "The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board of Defence: 1940-1945," International Journal, vol. 16 (196061), p. 63. （戻る）
41. Journal of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, 23rd Meeting, 10 and 11 November 1941, King Papers, MG24J4, vol. 320, file 3370, PAC. （戻る）

C. カナダ連邦政府の次官はUnder-Secretaryと呼ばれる。1941年にキングは自由党党首で連邦政府首相であると同時に、外務大臣（Secretary of State for External Affairs）を兼任していた。 （戻る）

42. このような策略の例としては、イアン・マッケンジーとノーマン・ロバートソン間の、アジア系カナダ人常任委員会の1942年春の委員選出についての書簡のやり取りを参照。External Affairs Records, 773-B-40C, EAA; インタビュー Keenleyside, and Henry F. Angus, Vancouver, B.C. （戻る）
43. Vernon A.M. Kemp, Without Fear, Favour or Affection: ThirtyFive Years With the R.C.M.P. (Toronto: Longman, Green and Co., 1958), pp. 235Ð36; Nora and William Kelly, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police: A Century of History: 1873Ð1973 (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1973), pp. 145, 149Ð150; Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Commissioner's Report, 1938Ð46 (Ottawa: 1939Ð47); interview with Keenleyside. （戻る）
44. Mead to Wood, 21 August 1940, loc. cit.（戻る）
45. バンクーバーの初期の日系人社会の性質については、次を参照。Kazuo Ito, 一世: A History of Japanese Immigration in North America, Seattle: Hokubei Hyakunen Sakura Jikkoiinkai, 1973; and Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was. （戻る）
46. 著者によるインタビュー。 （戻る）
47. 著者によるインタビュー; Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Commissioner's Report, 1939, p. 81. （戻る）
48. Mead to Wood, 21 August 1941, loc. cit. （戻る）
49. Ibid. （戻る）
50. Ibid. （戻る）
51. Maj. Gen. H.G.D. Crerar, Chief of General Staff, to S.T. Wood, 2 September 1940, Department of National Defence Papers, RG24, vol. 2730, file HQS4199x, PAC. （戻る）
52. Maurice A. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Maurice A. Pope, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962, p. 177.（戻る）
53. Ibid.（戻る）
54. King to Pattullo, 21 August 1940, loc. cit. （戻る）
55. C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Government: The War Policies of Canada, 1939Ð1945. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962, p. 43. （戻る）
56. Ibid, p. 47. （戻る）

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